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American and European Technological Differences: The Case of the Early Motor Car 
Power Source  
James Foreman-Peck 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Leslie Hannah contends that Europe was a more integrated market than the US at the turn of the 
twentieth century. This paper shows lesser integration is part of the explanation for why the US 
was slower than Europe to standardise technology on the internal combustion engine for the motor 
car. The remaining contribution is that of US abundant oil deposits and water that encouraged the 
American development of cheaper first cost steam engines. These used more (liquid) fuel and less 
capital. In Europe, oil fuel prices relative to skilled labour were less appropriate for steam and 
European car entrepreneurs therefore focussed on internal combustion engines. Distinctive US 
conditions were much less helpful for innovation and improvement before the continental US 
market was well established.  
 
 
Keywords: technology choice- motor car – national advantage – market size and integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
American and European Technological Differences: The Case of the Early Motor Car 
Power Source  
Despite extraordinary growth and productivity, the US economy in the early twentieth century was 
economically fragmented compared with the economies of western Europe1. Leslie Hannah has 
shown that European integration was achieved with ships and US integration with rail. Where 
Europeans used trains, the United States used horses.  Coupled with the population distribution 
and the geography, transport mode differences created greater barriers to internal trade in the 
United States. Also, there was little competition in the US from outside, Hannah maintains; high 
tariff barriers protected the home market2.  
 
These features were major contributors to the temporary American interest in steam cars that 
European entrepreneurs generally avoided at the beginning of the twentieth century. Steam cars 
were light vehicles – often using bicycle components – and were powered by liquid fuel. For their 
success an essential innovation was the ‘flash’ boiler, where the tubes could be kept so hot that the 
water feed was quickly flashed into steam. The Stanley brothers’ 1899 steam model boiler operated 
at pressures of about 150 psi, but was tested to 750 psi3, and their car’s range was about 60 miles 
with a maximum speed of around 25 mph4. 
 
In Europe the preferred car power source of the time was the internal combustion engine, burning 
similar fuel but in typically heavier vehicles. This paper contends that the technological divergence 
was because competition and knowledge diffusion in development of the motor car was more 
intense in Europe than in the US at the beginning of the twentieth century. Using data from motor 
trials and contemporary technical literature, it shows that rapid technological development in 
Europe eventually ensured that, even with US resource endowments – abundant oil and water - the 
internal combustion engine was a superior technology and that the US substantially switched to 
the European technological trajectory from 1902. 
 
Some previous interpretations perhaps have been influenced by the widely supposed superiority 
of US industrial technology, later exemplified in the first half of the twentieth century by the world-
dominating huge volumes of US motor cars produced at low prices5. In an industry subject to 
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economies of scale some researchers have seen the earliest phase as the outcome of the same 
feature. A firm that happens to produce a good (internal combustion) car permanently gets ahead 
of rivals (steam cars) by bringing down product price as volume expands. Hence, in this view, the 
mere chance emergence of a product able to achieve temporary scale economies could lock in the 
adoption of internal combustion as the power source for the motor car for ever after. Yet other 
technologies (especially steam) supposedly could have performed as well6. Other writers instead 
have seen the victory of internal combustion as a technological inevitability, but without 
explaining the American lag behind Western Europe7. 
 
Examination of the technological history of the motor industry between 1894 and 1904 not only 
allows some testing of these views, but also sheds light on the drivers of technical progress at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. The following section describes the pattern of car power source 
use in 1900 in four countries The next section shows evidence for this initial international 
configuration being locally optimal choices of techniques. The third section explains how the 
technological trajectory illuminates the pace of internal combustion engine development relative 
to steam especially in the decade after 1894. 
 
Power Source Innovation and Differences Between Countries  
The early power source innovations were in Germany where Daimler’s internal combustion engine 
of 1885 was fundamental. Daimler tested his engine on a motor boat in 18868. In the same year 
Benz ran what is generally accepted as the first practical motor car9. Even though it was invented 
in Germany, the country was backward in using the internal combustion car. Understandably, in 
Mannheim, where Benz employed 800 men, there were quite a number of internal combustion 
engine motor cars on the streets10. But a total of only 24 private motor vehicles were registered in 
Berlin in 1900, showing how restricted Benz’s home market was. Official German opinion 
regarded the railways as satisfactory transport, and therefore restricted road vehicles11. Mor over, 
steam road vehicles were subject to annual safety checks that were prohibitively expensive. In 
Mainz at the turn of the century the city council refused permission for a large company to run 
auto cabs and carriages for public conveyance12. 
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By 1900 Benz had ceased to be the largest European and world internal combustion car 
manufacturer, making 600 cars (fewer than the French company Panhard et Levassor’s output for 
instance)13. Nonetheless, Benz’s production clearly dominated Olds’ in the US; Olds made only 
400 cars from mid-1899 through to 1900. Market repression by the German State did not depress 
European advances in the early motor industry because of the close integration of Western 
Europe14.The centre of innovation moved to France, where product development flourished, 
helped by good roads and a buoyant export market to free trade Britain. 
 
French competitive advantage may have been helped by legislation that did not preclude road 
testing of the infant motorcar, even though formally officialdom frowned upon road racing. The 
Prefect of Paris attempted to prevent the Paris-Amsterdam race but the organisers merely started 
the race earlier to avoid this prohibition15. As to the fine roads in the 1890s, these were a historical 
accident, due to the centralised French state and its perception of the need to control and defend16. 
 
The United States was exceptional where the power source for the early motor car is concerned, 
at the turn of the century. Measured by production volume in 1900, the internal combustion engine 
car was less popular than steam cars or even than electrically propelled vehicles (Table 1). The 
conclusion is broadly similar for car use; steam and electricity together powered more vehicles or 
models than internal combustion. In the 15 makes of cars most represented in New York 
registrations in early 1902, 438 were steamers, 320 were internal combustion cars and 104 were 
electric. The previous year in the New York car show 58 models were steamers, 23 were electric 
and 58 used the internal combustion engine17. Steam-powered traction engines were spreading 
rapidly in the United States as the century ended, having been widely employed as self-propelled 
power sources in Britain18. 
 
By 1904, the pattern and volume of US car output had been radically transformed; Table 1 shows 
the huge expansion of internal combustion cars while steam and electricity car output decline 
slightly, (though their growth resumed slightly in the next five years). The poor state of US roads 
- there were only 200 miles of paved roads outside cities - was a handicap for the US industry until 
cars became more powerful. But this should not have discriminated directly between power 
sources, though it may have inhibited the type of competition seen in France. 
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No production data comparable to those of the US are available for the European economies, but 
in Britain the composition of sales must have been very different from the US; in 1902 at least 9 
in 10 of cars on British roads were estimated to be propelled by internal combustion engines19. 
Many of these were French. French car output was much greater than that of the US in 1900 despite 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
the enormous disparity in populations and incomes per head of the two countries20 De Dion Bouton 
alone manufactured 1200 small internal combustion engine four wheeled cars in 1900, exceeding 
total US internal combustion output. Peugeot added perhaps another 500 internal combustion cars 
to the French total and Panhard et Levassor more than 700. By contrast the only prominent French 
steam car manufacturer, Serpollet, made around 100 cars compared with 1681 U.S. steamers21. 
 
Representation of foreign cars in rallies and races confirm the differing technologies and 
advantages of Western Europe, especially France, and the US. Free trade Britain provides a 
valuable market natural experiment.  In the 1902 British Automobile Club Reliability Trial the 
only American cars competing were low priced steamers22. In the US Autoclub Trial of 1902 the 
French were prominent among the internal combustion engine models, but most of the US 
competitors were steamers23. Although the data are more problematic, this international pattern of 
power source use is corroborated by counts of models. The US dominated steam and electricity, 
while France and Germany focussed almost exclusively on the internal combustion engine24.  The 
early UK industry was repressed first by safetly legislation and then by patents, leaving much of 
the national market to French imports25. 
 
The Choice of Technique 
 
Why was US motor technology different from that of Europe in 1900? Market integration was one 
element favouring Europe, despite slower economic growth than the US and substantial national 
legal barriers. Close links of the common market of France, Germany and UK were exemplified 
by the travels of internal combustion innovator Daimler26. The openness and diversity of European 
legal and institutional environments prevented the repression of development opportunities 
everywhere even when, as in Germany, a national market was constrained by political disfavour. 
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The lesser market integration in 1897 is shown by the ‘astonishing and unaccountable gap in the 
transmission of technical knowledge’, both within the embryonic US industry and between the US 
and Europe27. Whereas the basic design of the motor car had been worked out in the 1890s in 
France by Panhard and Levassor, US engineers and designers continued to address into the 
twentieth century problems already solved in Europe28. This must be attributed to the market size, 
lack of market integration and competition compared with Europe (and therefore poorer 
information flows) and the 45% US protective tariff. The population of western Europe was more 
than double that of the US in 1900. Although average GDP per head was perhaps a quarter less 
than in the US the distribution of income was likely to have been more fundamental for the demand 
for cars.  
 
Divergent market integration between the US and Western Europe is suggested by the number of 
competitors entered in the early motor trials. The Paris-Rouen trial of 1894 attracted 21 qualifying 
vehicles of which 17 finished. The next year the Chicago Trial – admittedly in worse weather – 
attracted only six vehicles of which two finished. The direction of the human capital flow is 
consistent with market integration conferring advantages on European motor industry 
development. US car-maker Winton hired as his chief engineer a French-trained Parisian working 
for Panhard and Levassor29. Other US firms also recruited French motor engineers at the turn of 
the century30.  Henry Ford reverse engineered a crashed French car to find from what its valves 
were made. He then imported from Europe the vanadium steel technology31. 
Slow US car progress, in particular with the internal combustion engine, stemmed from the US 
focus on steam and electricity power, in turn attributable to factor prices.  Natural resource 
abundance -water and oil - and skilled labour scarcity explain the early popularity of the steam car 
in the US; by the end of the nineteenth century the technology expensive skilled labour and used 
cheap water and distilled oil abundantly32. The US steam car employed a simpler engine than the 
internal combustion powered car, it could not stall, and needed no gear box. With the introduction 
of liquid fuel and the flash boiler, starting was nearly instantaneous providing that the pilot light 
was burning. Especially in hilly regions where soft water from horse troughs was available, the 
steamer’s power and simplicity were much appreciated33. The very heavy consumption of water 
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by, for example, US Locomobiles, was much less acceptable in Europe34 This was not an intrinsic 
drawback of the steamer; when fitted with a condenser, as was the White steamer, the consumption 
of water was much reduced, but a condenser added to the first cost of the vehicle.  
 
US Locomobile steamers in the British market of 1902 were cheap (£2-300) because they were 
simple. The vertical fire tube boiler was easy to make. Compared with the single cylinder internal 
combustion engine cars in the same price range, US steamers were also smooth running, thanks to 
their twin cylinders and not requiring a gear box.  The steamer burnt gasoline (petrol) or kerosene 
(paraffin) like the internal combustion vehicle. Gasoline was usually preferred because it burned 
more cleanly and consistently.  However, steamers were less physically efficient than internal 
combustion cars; the fuel was used to heat water which propelled the car whereas the internal 
combustion engine exploded the fuel to drive the piston directly35. As shown below, this typically 
meant the steamer burned twice as much fuel as the internal combustion engine car (at least in the 
US), and buyers in Britain took notice of this cost36. US gasoline prices were around 11-14 cents 
a gallon between 1899 and 1910 whereas in Europe they were perhaps three times higher37. By 
1913, when US prices reached 17 cents, motorists in London and Paris were paying 5038.. 
 
The heavy fuel consumption of the Locomobile, and the marked improvement of the White 
steamer, were amply demonstrated in the 100 miles non-stop USA Auto Club trial of May 190139.
For this sample steamers averaged 8.4 miles per gallon of fuel and internal combustion engine cars 
fuel efficiency was almost twice that, at 16.1 mpg.  
 
Did running costs matter? As early as 1893 Levassor had sold cars to six doctors, five travelling 
salesmen and three insurance agents40. Such users may be expected to have compared the total 
costs of transport types for their businesses (the annual running costs of a horse were comparable 
to the purchase price). W E Buzby of New York in 1898 recounted one year of driving an electric 
Riker41. He covered 20 miles every day at a cost of $10 per month with 2 passengers in his $2500 
carriage. Two years later Dr Zabriskie of Brooklyn, who drove a 6 inch cylinder Winton 25 miles 
a day, claimed to have saved $42 per month over horses, on unpaved roads and fuelled by stove 
gasoline at 13.5c per gallon42. The interest noted by 'practical capitalists' in the US 1895 race was 
further indication of commercial monitoring of the infant motor car43. 
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Under some European conditions the greater fuel consumption of American steamers would offset 
their lower first costs. Certain expenses such as tyres were common to all motor vehicles. Survival 
of steam or internal combustion turned on the market assessment of the performance characteristics 
of the two power sources, having controlled for their generalised costs.  As reliability, and therefore 
annual mileage and car life increased, fuel prices and fuel consumption assumed greater 
importance in full car costs. For low lifetime mileages, first costs dominated, but as mileages 
increased, the balance tipped against the fuel-intensive steamer. This could contribute a reason for 
the switch away from steam as the car developed. 
 
The steam/ internal combustion engine running cost differential (RC) expression is; 
         n 
RC= Σ {(mpgs-1-mpgic-1)p.a}/(1+r)n-1                                        ….(1) 
 
where n is the number of years the car is kept on the road, mpgs, is the miles per gallon of the 
steamer, mpgic is the miles per gallon of the internal combustion engine car, p is the fuel price, a 
is the annual mileage and r is the discount rate. Using this expression Table 2 illustrates how in 
Europe higher fuel prices militated against steamers earlier than in the US. In the table the vehicle 
is assumed to be driven for 6000 miles a year44. Other assumptions are a European price of 35 
cents a gallon, a five year life, and a discount rate of 5% p.a.  
 
For one scenario the table uses the steam and internal combustion average fuel consumption from 
the US Trial of 1901 discussed above (internal combustion 16 and steam 8, miles per gallon).  
Then, the present value of differential running costs in Europe was more than £100 (Table 2). But 
this is probably an overstatement because with cheaper fuel in the US, internal combustion cars 
and steamers were likely to consume more fuel with bigger engines. In the British Trial of 1902 
steamers averaged about 16 miles per gallon of petrol and internal combustion cars. At a European 
fuel price level  the fuel-consumption cost penalty of steamers was nearer £40. The US cost penalty 
of steamers can be found, when US fuel prices were one third those in Europe, by dividing the 
European cost penalty by three. This small figure offered a minimal incentive to ignore the merits 
of steamers. Doubling the expected mileage doubles the cost penalty. Comparing European  (free 
trade) price differentials of, say, Locomobiles at £200 and single cylinder internal combustion 
 
 
 
10 
 
Renaults or De Dion Boutons at £245 in 1902 it looks possible that the extra Locomobile fuel cost 
could be the explanation. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
            These calculations are supported by the market valuation of US steamers’ fuel  
consumption in the UK according to a hedonic price index estimated for 42 vehicles that finished 
in the 1902 Automobile Club UK 650 mile trial45.  In a competitive market for a differentiated 
product such as a car, the price will be higher if it supplies more characteristics that some buyers 
want. The way attributes, such as horsepower, number of cylinders and fuel consumption, are 
combined and how much they cost depend upon the technology embodied in the car model. Those 
models employing superior technology will either supply more desired characteristics for the same 
price than rivals, or the same attributes as competitors but at a lower price. Either way, there should 
be a frontier of best practice technology marked out by superior car models. Behind the frontier 
less successful car technologies should be spread at greater distances the less effective are the 
models.  The less integrated the market, the greater the dispersion behind the frontier and the 
further from the frontier is a model, the smaller the market share it is likely to achieve. 
 
If fuel consumption mattered to British buyers in 1902, as the hypothesis about the development 
of internal combustion engines requires, then ‘thirsty’ vehicles would only be demanded at lower 
prices, other things being equal. If steamers were inconvenient in some way relative to internal 
combustion cars then again, other things being equal they would be sold at a discount.  
Price can be thought of as a cost that the market is willing to pay, and therefore as a valuation of 
the car’s characteristics. The formulation adopted here is a stochastic frontier cost equation of the 
form 
Price = a0 + a1 Fuel + a2 Cylinders + a3 Horsepower + v + u.        … (2) 
v is the normally distributed disturbance term and u is the ‘technical efficiency’ component, with 
a one-sided distribution46. The density function of v + u is asymmetrically distributed about zero. 
In (2) and Table 3 u ≥ 0 is assumed to be from a half-normal distribution and the frontier functions 
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are estimated by maximum likelihood. The closer a car price is to the lowest on the market for the 
combination of characteristics embodied in it, the smaller is u47. The other model reported in 
Table3 simply replaces u with a dummy variable for steam cars and is estimated by OLS. 
 
The variance (σ2=sig2) of inefficiency (measured by u) is statistically significant in equations (i) 
and (ii) of Table 3 and for equations (iii) and (iv) the explained variance is high at over 90 percent48. 
The efficiency terms for each car show that US steamers were generally no worse than the average 
Trial entrant (although one Locomobile was the fifth most inefficient, another was the fourth most 
efficient). In 1902 US steamers were a competitive technology in the UK free trade market; their 
qualities took them so close to the UK efficiency frontier that even with different factor prices in 
the UK their high fuel consumption was offset by their lower price. 
 
The biggest inefficiency terms were for an internal combustion engine Panhard – t t received the 
highest marks in the 1902 Trial49  - and for two expensive (£600) French steamers, the Gardner-
Serpollets (the only European steamers completing the Trial). These conclusions about the 
efficiency terms are checked in OLS equations (iii and iv) with dummy variables. The equation 
confirms that the US steamers were, on average, judged no different from other cars once their 
higher fuel consumption was taken into account and that the French Serpollets were unusually 
expensive. Serpollet’s cars were not a commercial proposition 50.  
These equations also show that vehicles with a high fuel consumption, in relation to their weight 
and otherwise, were priced at a substantial discount. According to equation (i) this greater fuel 
consumption would reduce by 17% the price for which these cars could be sold (and the probably 
more reliable OLS equation (iii) by 20%). The mean fuel consumption for all steam cars was 46 
gallons,51 statistically highly different from the 30 gallon average for internal combustion. From 
the OLS coefficient of (iv) this implies a 16% lower price for steamers.  Overall these results 
indicate that a £200 Locomobile would have been competitive with an internal combustion car in 
the UK, such as the single cylinder Renault, priced at £245, and above.  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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They are also consistent with (the third row of) Table 2. Other implications of the regression are 
that an increase in the number of cylinders from, say, two to four would raise the price by about 
(2 x 0.19=) 38%. A car of 12 horsepower, say, would on average, compared with a 6 HP car, fetch 
a price around (6 x 0.04 =) 24% higher.  
Although US steamers were so close to the frontier in the US that they could compete in the 
different economic environment of the UK in 190252, the trajectory of  power source development 
ensured this competitiveness could not be maintained. By 1903 US internal combustion engine 
cars (Winton, Cadillac and Oldsmobile) were entering and completing the RAC trial in the UK 
(joining US steamers Stanley and White); the switch in technological trajectory was underway53.  
 
The Internal Combustion Engine Trajectory and Steam ‘Lock out’  
High US labour productivity in manufacturing is often linked with  distinctively American 
‘technological trajectories’54. Some technologies have more progressive trajectories, potential for 
productivity improvement, than others at given stages of development. Trajectories are determined 
by physical laws, national resources and institutions as well as by parallel developments in other 
technological fields55. Though initially, standardised US demand, raw material abundance and 
skilled labour scarcity merely directed entrepreneurs to choose techniques different from those in 
Europe, the competitive success of. US multinational enterprise abroad suggests that American 
technologies were typically more productive in non-American environments as well56. As US 
production experience accumulated in specific technologies, the incentives for business in other 
economies to adopt US techniques became greater.  
 
If this was the universal pattern of innovation at the turn of the century, the early and enthusiastic 
US adoption of the steam car might imply the technology would eventually spread to the rest of 
the world. But quite quickly the opposite occurred. Either historical accident ‘locked out’ US steam 
technology or US resource endowments did not invariably direct the market to adopt the most 
progressive technological trajectories 
 
There are three prominent pieces of evidence that steam cars were not locked out by internal 
combustion cars. The first is that the choice of propulsion technique emerged in repeated open 
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competition in the European market. A temporary advantage in this competition would not be 
enough for a permanent lead unless volume production substantially reduced unit costs of a  
successful (internal combustion) car model (the Ford Model T is sometimes cited) that then ‘locks 
out’ other technologies. If the largest volume producer got to stay ahead then the Locomobile 
steamer should have continued to flourish; in the US , unlike Europe, the earliest high volume 
model was the Locomobile steamer (a total of 5200 were sold between 1899 and 1903). But this 
did not prevent the internal combustion Oldsmobile in 1902 exceeding the peak annual production 
achieved by Locomobile (selling 2500, then 4000 in 1903 and 5000 in 190457) Internal economies 
of scale were not a plausible source of ‘lock in’ in this period.  
The second piece of evidence that steam cars were not locked out is that,  although by 1904 
Oldsmobile may have been the largest producers, other internal combustion car companies 
produced over 70% of US internal combustion output. External rather than internal economies 
would need to be drivers of permanent advantage. When Olds moved to a new site in 1901 much 
of the manufacturing was contracted out to three firms respectively to make engines, transmissions 
and bodies. But many of car components benefiting from scale economies of interchangeable parts 
mass produced would have been common to both steam and internal combustion cars58. Earlier, 
the Stanley brothers had demonstrated the general principle by utilising bicycle manufacturers to 
supply the frame for their steam cars59. 
The availability of component manufacturers is an external economy that might have locked in an 
inferior technology.  But the wide spatial distribution of US car manufacturing in 1900 suggests 
that there were no major  external economies in production. Massachusetts with 17 establishments 
produced the largest number of cars, Connecticut with four establishments made the highest value 
cars, with New York achieving third place according to both criteria and first place with number 
of establishments, 2160. Spatial concentration increased by 1904 moving away from these areas, 
as internal combustion car production took off. As earlier with traction engines, the mid-West was 
by then the locational focus, suggesting that there were fundamental  forces at work other than 
production external effects . Michigan and Ohio dominated internal combustion engine car 
production, and therefore all US car production, as much as they had with traction engines four 
years earlier (49.5%). The internal combustion engine by then better satisfied the demand from 
agriculture, displacing steam traction engines. The triumph of internal combustion therefore was 
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not an accident due to the temporary achievement of one model or manufacturer. Good models 
were a necessary condition for volume production, not vice versa. The ‘lock in’ hypothesis gets 
matters the wrong way round. 
The third piece of evidence is that established producers and new entrants tried steam and found it 
less viable than internal combustion power for cars. Olds and Ford among others in the US61 and 
De Dion in France experimented with steam before switching to internal combustion, and 
Locomobile abandoned steam power in 1904, also counts against the notion that ultimately steam 
was a viable competitor for cars. Before Ford moved into high volume production steam had been 
virtually eliminated.  
Although Comte Albert de Dion and George Bouton won the 1894 Paris-Rouen trial in a steamer, 
in the following year's Paris-Bordeaux trial De Dion’s steamers did not finish. This failure 
confirmed De Dion’s belief in the superiority of the internal combustion engine for cars, on which 
he focused. The result was the De Dion-Bouton internal combustion engine of 1895 that could 
achieve 1500 rpm, double that of the Daimler engine, also with a far superior power to weight 
ratio62. Before Daimler’s engine, oil and gas engines achieved only about 1 hp for every 300 lbs 
of engine weight. Daimler improved this to 1 hp for 90 lb. The De Dion Bouton engine of 1895 
managed one horsepower for about every 25 lbs up to 8 hp (improvement by a factor of 12)63.  As 
well as those in De Dion-Bouton tricycles and cars, many De-Dion internal combustion engines 
were sold separately and abroad, as the 1898 Paris exhibition showed; half the ninety exhibitors at 
the exhibition used De Dion engines64. 
 
As the De Dion case shows, the European internal combustion car technical trajectory is 
particularly amenable to study because the series of public trials created performance data for the 
public domain65. In France, the series of car races or rallies beginning in 1894 (Paris-Rouen) 
ultimately secured the triumph of internal combustion engines, and also displayed the erratic 
performance of steam power. Thereafter only two steam vehicles completed their courses, the first 
as the slowest in 1895, the second as the fastest in 1897. Despite this last success, the decision of 
the technological selection process was conveyed by so few steamers finishing. De Dion Bouton, 
the largest French motor manufacturer in 1900 measured by employment, whose owner drove the 
successful steamer in 1897 race, abandoned steam for cars soon after66.  
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Each trial indicates a different point on the technological trajectory of the French internal 
combustion engine as a power source for the motor car. The rise in average, maximum and 
minimum speeds over the years 1895 to 1900 is a fair indication of the rapid improvement in the 
effective power output, and reliability, of the internal combustion engine (Table 4). Each year's 
observation may not be exactly comparable with the next, because the distance travelled differs. 
But maximum and average speed rise rapidly and inexorably.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
       
Unfortunately, there is only indirect and piecemeal evidence of the technical trajectory of steam 
cars - such as world speed records. The Frenchman Leon Serpollet patented a ‘flash’ boiler in 1887 
and continued to work on improving his steam cars, culminating in his world speed record of 75 
mph in 190267. But he sold very few of these luxury products.  The emergence of the most 
successful steam car design in the US, the Stanley’s Locomobile, illustrates the contribution of 
localised learning and the transmission of implicit knowledge through personal contact and 
proximity. It also suggests a narrower range of competition and information exchange than in 
Western Europe. The Stanley brothers, the most successful US steam car makers drew on a local 
inventive tradition when they entered the new industry from photography, their first success. 
Sylvester Roper (1824-1896) of Roxbury Massachusetts, spent much of his life experimenting 
with road steamers. George E Whitney worked in Roper’s shop occasionally and finished his first 
steamer, much like Roper’s vehicles, in the year Roper died. The Stanley brothers near the same 
town as Whitniey, Boston, made two steamers in 1897 and 1898 rather similar to those of Whitney 
but lighter. These were prototypes for the best-selling Locomobile68. The brothers went on to build 
the Stanley steamer that recovered the speed record in 1906, achieving 121mph . But by then it 
was clear the era of steam cars was over in the Us as well as in Europe; convenience and reliability 
were more important for the market than a high top speed.  
 Concluding Remarks 
Leslie Hannah’s insight in to US market integration around 1900 has been employed here to 
explain a surprising if temporary divergence between European and American technologies; the 
survival of the steam car in the US after it had been largely abandoned in Europe. The paper adds 
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a second explanation for the US technological lag; evidence that these steamers were examples of 
natural resource-intensive technology likely to be too expensive for Europe. Liquid fuel was far 
cheaper in the US and could be consumed more lavishly, as the steam car required. The early US 
steam car was made at a lower first cost than the more complex internal combustion engine vehicle 
and, for a brief while, that promised to offset the higher fuel costs. In this instance, unusually 
however, US technology was not superior to that in Europe. 
 
The US switched technologies or techniques when it did for the same reason Europe changed 
earlier- the internal combustion trajectory was more progressive than steam and running costs 
became more important as the lifetime mileage of a vehicle increased. Europe adopted the winning 
technology in this case because competition and a wider more integrated market showed that the 
natural resource-economising technology happened to yield greater benefits in the long term. The 
eventual similar outcome on the two continents suggests the internal combustion engine filled a 
distinct ‘ecological niche’. 
 
 Even within Europe, institutional environments and national traditions were sufficiently varied to 
recognise experimentation within the major economies as different realisations of similar 
innovative processes. Over the longer run, the emergence of the internal combustion engine motor 
car was not, as sometimes maintained, sensitive to ‘chance’, such as the availability of good roads 
or repressive legislation. Economies of scale were no source of 'lock in' to internal combustion 
engines, for long before Fordism took root, the selection process was complete.  
 
Nor was the (1895) Selden patent, requiring all US automobile manufacturers to pay royalties, an 
alternative explanation for US internal combustion backwardness69. The small size of the 
surcharge and the ease of access to the patent right ensured that.  The Lawson patent probably 
mattered more for the retarded production of UK internal combustion (working at Wolseley, 
Austin abandoned an early car design because of it70) but the surcharge possibility was removed 
in 1901. And anyway, the numerous French car imports to the UK were internal combustion, and 
dominated usage.  
Similar circumstances triggered other successful innovative responses in Europe towards the end 
of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. The variety of jurisdictions within the 
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integrated European market allowed Marconi to take his wireless telegraphy expertise from Italy 
where it was rejected, to Britain in 1896, where it was developed71. From there spinoff 
organisations included the Radio Corporation of America72. Innovative products substituted for 
scarcer natural materials. The Mannheim company BASF in 1897 launched its synthetic version 
of the most important natural dye, indigo, and then the company began developing the Haber-
Bosch process to synthesise ammonia from 190273. The UK company Courtauld’s innovation of 
Rayon in 1904/5 was an alternative to silk, spawning a US subsidiary in 191074. The Belgian Ernest 
Solvay developed the ammonia-soda process to provide alkali for the soap, textile, and glass 
industries. In 1884 the Solvay brothers licensed production of ‘soda ash’ in the US, and formed a 
joint venture to build and operate a plant in New York. By the 1890s, Solvay process plants 
produced most of the world's ‘soda ash’75. 
Successful innovation does not require the same conditions as high productivity manufacturing 
production, at which clearly the US excelled76. Fast US market growth allowed the development 
of, and investment in, established machinery (as in continuous paper production77). N etheless 
the US could (temporarily) lag Europe in what were to become major technologies. Distinctive US 
conditions were much less helpful for innovation and improvement, before the continental market 
was well established. 
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Appendix.  Car model distance from UK least price frontier 1902.  
(Most ‘inefficient’ highest value) 
 u Tech. effic. Eqn (1) Table 3 
 
Panhard 0.50693781 1 
Gardner-Serpollet 0.50322476 2 
Gardner Serpollet 0.43299542 3 
Germain 0.38850413 4 
Locomobile 0.3485114 5 
Daimler 0.3036191 6 
MMC 0.30084389 7 
Daimler 0.28835662 8 
Maudslay 0.28283319 9 
Ariel 0.27947913 10 
Decanville 0.27913832 11 
Locomobile 0.27066971 12 
De Dion Bouton 0.26594129 13 
Daimler 0.26259436 14 
Gladeator 0.20032741 15 
James-Browne 0.1966072 16 
Wolseley 0.19226487 17 
Humber 0.19023353 18 
Pascal 0.18107638 19 
Simms 0.15731874 20 
Renault 0.14424315 21 
White steamer 0.13566323 22 
MMC 0.13531233 23 
Clement 0.12574076 24 
Pascal 0.12138306 25 
Wolseley 0.11889155 26 
Peugeot 0.11792734 27 
Germain 0.11746051 28 
White steamer 0.11704075 29 
Century 0.1020298 30 
Belsize 0.09229987 31 
De Dion Bouton 0.08876098 32 
Brush 0.0758044 33 
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MMC Voiturette 0.07541759 34 
Locomobile 0.06661063 35 
Star 0.06545856 36 
Clement 0.06264601 37 
New Orlean 0.06018127 38 
Locomobile 0.05906994 39 
Brooke 0.05289157 40 
Wolseley 0.03585877 41 
Gladiator 0.03521615 42 
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 Thanks to J.M.Laux, anonymous referees and participants in the Reading March 2017 
conference. Responsibility for errors of fact and understanding remain mine. 
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Table 1 US production of motor vehicles by power source (percentage) 1900-1909 
         Year   Steam        Electric     Internal Combustion 
1900   1681 (40.1)  1575 (37.6)     936 (22.3) 
1904   1568  (7.2)   1425  (6.6)   18,699 (86.2) 
  1909   2374  (1.9)   3826  (3.0)  120,393 (95.1) 
Sources: Twelfth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Censuses of Manufactures in the United States 
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Table 2 Petrol fuel running costs differentials  
 
steam 
mpg 
i.c. 
mpg Mileage 
fuel 
price PV 
US 1901 Trial 8 16 6000 35c £117 
British 1902 
Trial 16 24 6000 35c £39 
British 1902 
Trial 16 24 6000 42c £47 
 
Note: calculated from expression 1.  
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Table 3 Regressions of Prices of Cars in the UK Automobile Trial 1902 
 (i) (ii)  (iii) (iv) 
 
Dep. Var. 
ln price Frontier Frontier OLS OLS 
                 
Fuel 
gal/cwt  -0.171***  -0.205**              
 (0.0429)  (0.0636)              
     
H P 0.0356*** 0.0236** 0.0437*** 0.0376*** 
 (0.0067) (0.00737) (0.00716) (0.00884) 
     
Cylinders 0.230*** 0.193*** 0.200*** 0.181*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0351) (0.0331) (0.0357) 
     
Fuel cons. 
Gal.  -0.0054*  -0.0100**  
  (0.0022)  (0.00326) 
     
Laden 
weight  0.0298*** 0.0227*   
  (0.00734)  (0.0088) 
     
Gardner-Serpollet  0.395** 0.471**  
   (0.136) (0.173) 
     
Steam   0.0562 0.0228 
   (0.11) (0.0965) 
     
Constant 5.201*** 4.738*** 5.388*** 5.008*** 
 (0.097) (0.113) (0.109) (0.126) 
     
Ln sig2 v -4.899*** -4.18***               
 (1.16) (0.53)               
                 
Ln sig2 u -3.072*** -4.133**   
 (0.708)  (1.378)               
                 
N 42 42 42 42 
R2 adj.   0.906 0.909 
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Notes:   s.e. in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, 
               frontier efficiency term half normal distribution. 
Table 4 Technological Trajectory of the Internal Combustion Engine 1895-1900 from  
French Motor Car Races 
                Av. speed Max.speed  No. of finishers Dist.  Min. speed 
June   1895   11.8*       15.25           9++             744 miles    9.0 
Sept   1896   14.3         15.9              9            1077 miles   12.8 
July   1897   20.4+        23.1            15x             106 miles   16.5 
July   1898   21.8         27.0              17             895 miles   15.2 
May   1899   25.4         29.9             12              351 miles   22.1 
July   1899    26.5         31.9             11            1440 miles   18.8 
March 1900   30.8         37.0             16**         125 miles   17.3 
Source: calculated from W Worby Beaumont Motor Vehicles and Motors: Their Design, 
Construction and Working by Steam, Oil and Electricity, Constable, London 2 vols 1900,1906 
vol 2 p685, vol 1 p388 , pp380-1. 
Notes:   * Bollee steamer 8.23           ++ 8 int. comb. 
         + DeDion Bouton Steamer 24.6          x 14 int comb         ** excl Werner bicycle 21.4    
 
 
 
